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In the late 1970s, China launched economic reforms that initiated the country’s transi-
tion from a planned economy toward a “socialist market economy“ (Wang, 2000, p.2).
In the course of these reforms, the foreign trade regime has been liberalized consider-
ably. The reforms led to remarkable reductions in poverty; however, income inequality
has increased steadily and is considered a primary challenge for China’s development
(Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Dollar, 2007). In this context, poverty and inequality impacts
of further trade reform efforts which might follow a WTO Doha Round agreement or
bilateral free trade agreements remain in the focus of the political discussion.
Growing rural-urban and regional disparities are important dimensions of inequality in
China and have triggered large scale population movements; the number of temporary
rural-urban migrants is estimated at around 136 m (Fang et al., 2009). Not surprisingly,
migration plays a highly important role for the livelihoods of households in rural China.
Migration has become one of the strongest forces affecting the rural economy in the past
decades. It had the fastest growing share in the off-farm labour market and has played
an important role in determining the income of rural households, accounting for approxi-
mately 9% of total rural incomes in 2001 (de Brauw et al., 2002; de Brauw and Rozelle,
2008; Knight and Song, 1999). Migration fulﬁls an important function in linking rural
economies with industrial and services sectors of urban areas and in transmitting policy
impacts to rural households. Therefore, the impact of policy reforms on rural households
may depend strongly on the access of these households to migration as well as on their
migration behaviour. In this context, household characteristics such as demographics are
highly important.
Thispapertakesavillagelevelperspectiveand isbasedonavillagecomputablegeneral
equilibrium (CGE) model which was developed to study the impacts of trade liberalisa-
tion on a small rural community in South-western China. In the model, the importance
of migration and the role of migration behaviour for the household and village level out-
comes of policy reforms are recognised through the application of an innovative approach
towards the modelling of the households’ labour allocation behaviour.
2 Modelling approach
The present study applies a village CGE model to assess village level impacts of trade
liberalisation in China. Given the insights from the above discussion, the model puts
great emphasis on the modelling of households labour allocation behaviour, in particular
migration. Regarding the modelling of migration in a village CGE model, two princi-
pal issues arise. First, migration always creates feedbacks to a household’s consumption
sphere by altering consumption demand as a consequence of changes in the household
size. These effects constitute a beneﬁt additional to the receipt of remittances to the
household which impacts the migration behaviour. Second, migration involves psycho-
logical costs to the households, i.e. creates disutility which makes engagement in this
activity less attractive. These disutilities can determine the migration behaviour and lead
to observable differences in migration responses among households and, given the role of
migration as income source and a means to cope with economic shocks, different impacts
of a given policy reform. The differences in migration behaviour, in turn, can often be
2linked to certain characteristics of the households. The presence of children or elderly, for
example, may make migration a less attractive option for a young couple. Likewise, the
need for childcare may require at least one person to stay at home and make farm work
the preferred option for this person.
Bearing these considerations in mind, a reﬁned depiction of labour allocation is imple-
mented in the village CGEmodel. The approach takes into account household preferences
towards work in different types of employment as well as feedback links between house-
hold migration and consumption demand. This is achieved by the assumption of a com-
posite utility function which deﬁnes the behaviour of each household in the model (see
equation 1). The composite utility function consists of a consumption utility function
which captures utility created by commodity consumption and a labour utility function
which allows to account for the utility or disutility associated with the participation in
different types of employment. Thereby, the approach offers an innovative extension of
previous works on village modelling, such as those by Taylor and Adelman (1996) and
Kuiper (2005), which have not considered the disutility arising from certain employment
options.
Due to the necessity of capturing the effects of changes in household consumption de-
mand which arise following changes in migration, the consumption utility functionUC is
speciﬁed as a per capita expenditure system. A per adult equivalent Stone-Geary utility
function is chosen to represent consumption demand (see Kuiper, 2005, for a former ap-
plicationofthisapproach). ThelabourmarketparticipationcomponentUL ofthecompos-
ite utility function in this application is assumed to lead to increasingly negative marginal
utility of labour allocated to the different activities. This implies that households expe-
rience a certain degree of disutility from participation in any income generating activity
which increases with the amount of labour allocated.1 A simple sum of power functions
is used here.















∀ h ∈ H, f ∈ FU. (1)
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the consumption utility functionUC in which all
quantities of consumed commodities QDch are deﬁned per adult equivalent. σch describes
the ﬁxed committed (or subsistence) consumption quantities and γch are the marginal
expenditure shares (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). The consumption utility function is
deﬁned over all commodities consumed c by the households h, entering a set CD, and
leads to a linear expenditure system (LES).
The second term of the composite utility function constitutes the utility function for
labour market participation UL. Time worked in the different activities is expressed in
terms of a factor demand variable FDDfah. The set FU contains the ’utility’ factors,
i.e. the production factors which bear a utility connotation.2 The parameters εah and
δah determine how the time allocated to a particular activity a translates into utility. The
1The inclusion of utility aspects in an agricultural household model draws on work by Lopez (1984,
1986) and Sonoda (2008).
2This set in the current model only contains labour. It allows, however, for further disaggregation, e.g.
by gender.
3negative sign which precedes εah ensures that the households experience a disutility from
labour market participation. Only time worked in off-farm activities, represented by the
set AO in the model, is included into the labour utility function.
Constrained maximisation of the composite utility function leads to modiﬁed factor
demand functions which govern the households’ allocation of labour to different off-farm
activities. In case of migration (represented by a set HAOM in the model), the demand of









∀ a ∈ HAOM, f ∈ FU, h ∈ H.
(2)
This factor demand equation states, that households equate marginal returns from mi-
gration with marginal costs in the optimum. The marginal returns are the activity price
PAah, or the wage rate at the destination, multiplied with a remittance factor κh. The
marginal costs consist of three components. The ﬁrst component is the household spe-




fah reﬂects the disutility arising from migration to the speciﬁc
household. This generates a mark-up on the shadow wage and, equivalently, diminishes
the value of the returns from migration. The third component ∑c∈CDQDch∗PDch emerges
due to the deﬁnition of a per capita LES. As this third component takes a positive value,
it works contrary to the disutility component and increases the marginal returns from mi-
gration, thereby creating a feedback between the level of migration and the consumption
sphere.
The mechanics of Equation 2 are best illustrated through the effect a supposed increase
in PAah. First of all, a rising PAah requires that the right hand side of the equation in-
creases, too. This raises the household shadow wage and the time allocated to migration.
However, bothmovementsarecounteractedbyanincreaseintheterm∑c∈CDQDch∗PDch.
This increase happens due to the higher shadow wage, a higher income and, as a conse-
quence of the latter and a smaller household size, an increase in per capita consump-
tion quantities. Ultimately, a new equilibrium—which also involves second round effects
through changes in income and quantities consumed—with a different level of migration
is established. In general, the values of λh, εah and δah determine how fast the disutility
component changes from a change in migration, i.e. how much labour has to be shifted
to migration to achieve a given change in marginal disutility. The less labour is necessary
for a given change in disutility, the faster the equilibrium is established and the weaker is
the migration response of the household. Thus, the approach allows for the ﬂexible mod-
elling of different migration responses of rural households, taking into account not only
the marginal returns of migration, but also notions of household utility attached to this
activity and interactions between migration and the consumption sphere. Other off-farm
activities are similarly formulated.
Parameters of the factor demand function have to be calibrated such that Equation 2
holds at given prices and quantities. In principle, there is an inﬁnite number of possible
combinations of the three parameters which fulﬁl this condition. However, the parameters
cannot be calibrated independently from each other. In practice, the calibration is carried
3Taylor and Adelman (1996), for example, include only this component into their migration functions.
4out in four steps: First, given normalized prices, the quantities in the equation and κh are
calculated from the social accounting matrix (SAM) which underlies the model. Second,
λh is set equal to 1, leaving εah as the only undetermined shift parameter. Third, a value
of δah is chosen. Finally, the equation is solved for εah to calibrate this parameter. This
procedure is repeated until the desired labour supply response is achieved.
Thereby, the value of δah drives the reaction of the utility term to an exogenous shock.
If δah is close to 1, a change in the differential between WFh and PAah triggers a very
elastic response in the labour demand FDDfah, and correspondingly the labour supply
response of the household. The farther away δah moves from 1, the smaller becomes the
change in labour demand and the less elastic the labour supply response. Whereas for
δah > 1 the supply response to a rise in the own wage is positive, it becomes negative
for δah < 1. Thus, the prosed approach offers substantial ﬂexibility in the calibration of
households’ labour supply behaviour.
For the model simulations, the responses in migration have been calibrated to an own-
wage elasticity of 0.25 for all households, based on considerations regarding results on
the labour supply behaviour of Chinese rural households as presented by Sicular and Zhao
(2004).4 In informal local off-farm work, own-wage elasticities have been set to 0.50 and
in formal local off-farm work, households’ labour supply responses have been assumed
to be inelastic in order to take into account market entry restrictions to this sector.
Inthemodel, sixrepresentativehouseholdgroupsaredistinguished, stratiﬁedaccording
to the households’ demographic characteristics as well as income levels. Regarding the
former, the households which constitute the village are divided into two groups along
the median of the dependency ratio. Following the presumption that households with
a relatively high share of dependants are less inclined to migrate, this procedure yields
two aggregate representative households with different migration behaviour, namely a
low migration household with a weak migration response and a high migration household
which responds more strongly to incentives to migrate. Thus, the inﬂuence of household
demographics on labour allocation behaviour is implicitly modelled. The two migration
groups are further subdivided according to income terciles, allowing to assess different
impacts of trade reform on poorer and richer households.
The remaining parts of the model are fairly standard. All in all, four household speciﬁc
activities are modelled: farming, formal & informal local off-farm work and migration.
For agricultural production, a nested Leontief-Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed. In
farming, ﬁve inputs are used, namely land and family labour as well as three intermediate
input commodities (capital, services and hired labour). Apart from food of plant origin,
other food, non-food goods and services, which are manufactured commodities purchased
from the market, households consume parts of their agricultural output as well as leisure.
All commodities except for land are traded beyond village borders in a perfect market
environment, i.e., the village is assumed to be a price taker for these commodities. In case
of land, a village land rental market is modelled which reconciles demand and supply
for land under a uniform rental rate. In case of family labour, imperfect substitutability
of family labour and hired labour as well as the preference driven employment choices
discussed above lead to household speciﬁc shadow wages which differ from any of the
market wage rates of the different off-farm activities.
Themodelisbuiltuponavillagesocialaccountingmatrix(SAM)createdfromaunique
4As will be shown below, this leads to different migration responses.
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Source: Zhai and Hertel (2010); Zhai (2011); own calculations.
set of household data of the year 2006, gathered in a census survey carried out by re-
searchers of the International Food Policy Institute, the Chinese Academy of Agricultural
Sciences and Guizhou University in a village in Puding county in the Chinese province of
Guizhou (see, for example, Brown et al., 2010).
3 Policy scenario
In order to carry out policy simulations, price and wage changes following a unilateral
trade liberalisation by China obtained from a national level CGE simulation are fed as a
shock into the village model. These price and wage changes have been taken from a study
conducted by Zhai and Hertel (2010) which employs a comparative static CGE model for
the Chinese economy. This study is part of a recent undertaking to analyse the impact
of trade liberalisation on inequality and poverty (Anderson et al., 2010). Details on the
model can be found there.
The policy scenario analysed involves the elimination of all import tariffs and export
subsidies in the agricultural and lightly processed food sectors and the elimination of
import tariffs in all other sectors. In the base situation, the overall level of protection has
beenlow. Withaverageappliedtariffratesof6.5%and5.0%, respectively, theagricultural
and the food manufacturing sectors received the relatively highest levels of protection in
terms of tariffs in the base situation. Average tariffs applied to other sectors have been
consistently lower, ranging between 0.0% and 2.9%. Exports subsidies play only a role
in the agricultural sector, with an average rate of 0.8%. This initial structure of protection
leads to relatively modest price impacts of liberalisation. Prices and wages decline across
theboard, withmorenegativeeffectsontheagriculturalandfoodsectors(ZhaiandHertel,
2010). Table 1 presents the price and wage shock which has been constructed from the
simulation results obtained by Zhai and Hertel (2010) and which constitutes the policy
scenario to be analysed with the village equilibrium model.
Reﬂecting the relatively high level of protection in the base period, agricultural pro-
6Table 2: Impact of trade liberalisation on village trade.
% change % change
Exports Imports
Migrant labour 0.28 Intermediate inputs -0.29
Formal local off-farm labour -0.01 Food of plant origin -0.23
Informal local off-farm labour -0.54 Other food 0.00
Agricultural outputs 0.26 Non-food -0.90
Services -1.12
duction is affected most adversely among the three activities. The price of this activity,
i.e. the aggregate price of agricultural output, deteriorates by -1.79%. Activity prices
in the off-farm activities, i.e. wages, decline less. Wages in formal local off-farm work
decline by -1.03%, in informal local off-farm work the decrease is at -1.35% and in mi-
gration workers have to accept -1.17% lower payments. The differences in wage changes
mirror the skill levels of the individuals working in the different activities. Intermediate
input prices are by between -0.50% and -1.80% lower after trade reform. The strongest
decline is in the price of village imported labour, which is the wage for unskilled agricul-
tural labour. The decrease in consumer prices is between -0.66% in case of services and
-1.81% for other purchased food. The price for own-produced food is assumed to be the
same as the agricultural output price, reﬂecting the opportunity cost of self-consumption.
Hence, the same price change applies.
4 Results
The aggregate adjustments of the village to trade liberalisation in terms of changes in ex-
ports and village imports are presented in Table 2. An increase in the supply of migrant
labour and a lower supply of labour to local informal off-farm employment both are logi-
cal consequences of the relatively weak decline in the migration wage rate and a stronger
decline in the wage in informal off-farm work.
It is, however, surprising that the villages’ supply to formal off-farm employment de-
clines slightly in spite of a higher relative wage after reform. This happens because the
households which are active in this activity either reduce their overall labour supply due
to a strong substitution effect of a lower shadow wage on leisure consumption or have
strong preferences towards migration, triggering relatively strong migration responses at
the expense of the time worked in other activities (compare Tables 4 and 5).
Perhaps even more at odds with prior expectations is the change in village exports of
agricultural outputs. Agricultural exports increase although the price of the agricultural
activity has declined most of all activity prices. This phenomenon, however, is not the
result of higher outputs from farm production in the village, but stems from an average
increase inmarketed surplus(see Table4). This, inturn, is aconsequence ofreduced own-
consumption by the households as a reaction to a deterioration in income levels (compare
Table 6). Nonetheless, the village still increases migration by a larger extent than the
supply of agricultural products which would correspond to prior expectations regarding
the impact of a relatively strong decrease in agricultural prices.
On the import side, imports of the intermediate farm input into the village decreases
7Table 3: Impact of trade liberalisation on village income, poverty and inequality.
Base Scenario




Gini coefﬁcient 29.410 29.466
a %-change against baseline.
with trade reform. This is a consequence of a lower demand for this commodity by house-
holds of the high migration group which overcompensates for a higher demand by the low
migration households. The development of the imports of consumption commodities re-
ﬂects changes in consumption demand due to lower income levels. Imports of food of
plant origin, the non-food commodity as well as services decline and only those of other
food remain constant.
The lower levels of income already mentioned lead to slightly higher levels of poverty
in the village after trade reform. As reported in Table 3, both the poverty headcount (P0)
and the poverty gap index (P1) decrease by magnitudes of 0.5% and 1.8% against the
baseline.5 The increase in poverty is a result of a decline in total village income by around
-1.4%, which in turn stems from lower earnings of households from any of the activities
(Table 6). Inequality, as measured by the Gini coefﬁcient, has increased by around 0.2%,
thus following the general trend of rising inequality in China (Ravallion and Chen, 2007).
This increase in inequality is the consequence of a more adverse impact of trade reform
on the poorer strata of the village population (see Table 6).
The village level impacts mask substantial differences in the reactions of the different
representative households to the policy shock. As Table 4 illustrates, households of the
high migration group respond positively to the improved incentives to migrate whereas
those of the low migration group migrate less. Indeed, the high and middle income house-
holds of the high migration group show slightly positive migration responses, and the low
income household of this group even allocates 2.83% more time to the activity. In case
of these households, the relative increase in the migration wage sets incentives to migrate
more. These incentives are accentuated by cross-wage and cross-price effects mediated
via the decline in shadow wages due to an on average lower labour demand in the other
activities.
Thereby, the more pronounced response of the low income household is caused by
a comparatively strong impact of the shadow wage which ultimately stems from a very
low value of κh in Equation 2. A low value of κh implies a very low transmission of
migration wage shocks to the household itself. This requires δah in the migration labour
demand function of this household to take a very low value in order to achieve a migration
response which is comparable to that of other households. The corollary of this relatively
elastic calibration of the utility term of the household’s migration function is that a given
change in the shadow wage triggers a much stronger migration response than in case of
the other households.
5For the calculation of the poverty measures, a poverty line of 871 Yuan per capita and year has been
used.
8In contrast to the high migration households, households of the low migration group
all reduce the time worked in migration. This at the ﬁrst sight counter-intuitive reaction
is caused by a strong substitution effect of a lower household shadow wage (see Table
5) on the consumption of leisure and thereby on overall labour supply. Thereby, this is
consistent with the theoretical notion that low migration households because of the higher
shares of dependants require more work to be done in the household.
In case of informal local off-farm work, all households reduce the time worked in this
activity by a similar scale. In a consistent reaction to the relatively strong decline in
informal wages, households appear to substitute migration for time in informal off-farm
work, either by expanding migration or by reducing time in migration by a lower extent
than informal work.
Table 4: Impacts of trade liberalisation on household production (% change against baseline).
Low migration High migration All
High Middle Low Total High Middle Low Total
Factor demand and input use
Migration -0.22 -0.22 -0.16 -0.21 0.06 0.03 2.83 0.51 0.28
Formal local off-farm -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Informal local off-farm -0.55 -0.55 -0.61 -0.57 -0.48 -0.58 -0.60 -0.51 -0.54
Agriculture
Labour -0.18 0.08 2.12 0.63 -3.19 0.15 -2.35 -2.50 -0.53
Land 0.36 0.70 3.30 1.39 -3.58 0.70 -1.19 -1.20 0.00
Intermediate inputs 0.27 0.56 3.07 1.51 -3.51 0.59 -1.43 -1.44 -0.29
Activity output
Agriculture 0.27 0.56 3.07 1.19 -3.51 0.59 -1.43 -1.35 -0.21
Marketed surplus
Agriculture 0.76 1.54 6.31 2.47 -5.03 1.35 -1.40 -1.46 0.26
In agriculture, however, three out of the six households now even work more time on
the farm. This happens in spite of falling relative prices of farm output. Similarly, four
households expand the use of land and other farm inputs. In fact, only the high and the
low income household of the high migration group seem to draw out of farming while
they increase migration. These households also reduce the land area they farm, thereby
allowing others to expand their cultivated area.
Given identical exogenous changes in output prices and wages for all households, the
differences in the adjustments of agricultural input use are related to the absolute and
relative changes of (shadow) prices for land and labour following trade reform. In gen-
eral, land and household labour in the village becomes cheaper, thereby making the use
of these factors in farm production more attractive. Furthermore, for all but the high in-
come high migration household, land becomes cheaper compared to labour (see Table 5).
Hence, these households to a certain extent increase the ratio of land to labour used in
agricultural production and thereby seek to substitute the former for the latter. In the
tendency, households for which the decrease in the price for land is stronger relative to
the decline in the shadow wage decrease the use of labour relative to the use of land to
a larger extent than others. That is, these households substitute relatively more land for
labour. At the same time, the actual change in land use depends on the households’ labour
allocation decisions and the amount of labour in agricultural production. Accordingly, the
9households which use most labour for other activities, namely migration, decrease their
land use and end up making land available on the village market.
Table 5: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on endogenous prices (% change).
Low migration High migration All
High Middle Low Total High Middle Low Total
Endogenous prices
Family labour & leisure -2.05 -1.97 -1.45 -1.82 -2.96 -2.04 -1.42 -2.14 -1.98
Land -2.58
Regarding the changes in farm output contained in Table 4, changes in agricultural pro-
duction reﬂect the adjustments in land use. The high and the low income household of the
high migration group both reduce their levels of output by rather high magnitudes. The
households which use more land after reform, in contrast, expand their agricultural pro-
duction levels. Changes in marketed surplus of agricultural products reported in the same
table in most cases are more pronounced than output changes. Households with increased
outputs raise their marketed surplus by even higher margins and changes in percentage
terms are around twice as high as in case of agricultural output. These differences not
only stem from the per se lower absolute quantities of sales as compared to output, but
also from a decrease in consumption of own-produced food due to lower income levels.
Table 6 summarizes the impact of trade liberalisation on income, expenditure and wel-
fare. According to the results, households experience losses in net income by between
1.14% and 1.77%. High migration households have higher losses on average and those
with low income tend to be affected more negatively by the reform in terms of relative
income losses. The determinants of the pattern which arises are the changes in relative
income from the different sources as well as the earnings composition in the initial situa-
tion.
In case of remittances income, the households of the low migration group all have to
accept losses, ranging between -1.34% and -1.40%. In this group, the households with
higher income levels tend to lose more. In the high migration group, remittances received
by the high and middle income households also decline by -1.11% and -1.21%, respec-
tively. The low income household, in contrast, after reform receives 1.63% more in remit-
tances. The changes in remittances reﬂect lower migration wages as well as adjustments
in labour allocation made by the households.
Due to the deterioration in wages and a small supply response, income from formal
local off-farm work decreases by around -1.04% for all three households which work
in this activity. In case of informal local off-farm work, all households also have lower
earnings after reform. The rate of decrease is between -1.79% and -1.92%. Differences
between households are small, but low income households tend to have higher losses,
again related to stronger supply responses. Not least as a consequence of the relatively
strongest decline in the activity price, agricultural income is hurt most for all households.
Returns from farming decrease by between -1.99% and -3.27%, thus disproportionally
more than income from other activities. On average, the high migration households incur
higher relative losses than their low migration peers.
The reforms’ welfare impacts are measured by the EV expressed as percentage share
of per capita consumption expenditure in the baseline. According to the high reduction
10Table 6: Household level impact of trade liberalisation on income and welfare (% change).
Low migration High migration All
High Middle Low Total High Middle Low Total
Income
Net income -1.14 -1.39 -1.54 -1.29 -1.41 -1.44 -1.77 -1.42 -1.38
Remittances -1.40 -1.39 -1.34 -1.39 -1.11 -1.21 1.63 -1.08 -1.26
Formal off-farm -1.04 -1.04 -1.04 -1.04 -1.04 -1.04
Informal off-farm -1.87 -1.87 -1.92 -1.89 -1.79 -1.90 -1.91 -1.84 -1.86
Agriculture -2.51 -2.43 -1.99 -2.31 -3.27 -2.43 -2.82 -2.82 -2.58
Household welfare
EVa -0.48 -0.63 -0.82 -0.60 -0.55 -0.82 -1.22 -0.76 -0.67
CPIb -0.86
a % of per capita consumption expenditure in baseline.
b Average value for all households.
in net income relative to the CPI, the welfare outcome of the reform is negative for all
households. The EV ranges between -0.48% and -1.22% of consumption expenditure.
Regarding the relative impact by household groups, a clear pattern arises. High migra-
tion households are more negatively affected when using this measure and low migration
households less. Within the migration groups, low income household are hurt more than
high income households. This picture resembles the observation of rising village inequal-
ity made above. It should be noted, however, that the EV is calculated based on the LES
and that the utility component of labour market participation is not be taken into account.
Hence, the ﬁgures given do not reﬂect total utility changes.
5 Conclusions
Making a short assessment of simulations just presented, the results by and large corre-
spond to prior expectations. Net incomes as well as overall welfare are negatively affected
by trade reform and impacts appear to be more severe for low income households. The
patterns of the households’ migration responses appear to make sense. Low migration
households return from migration whereas high migration households tend to work more
outside the province. In this context, the result that people work less in local off-farm ac-
tivities as compared to migration is in line with the fact that local wages decline relatively
more than migrant wages. It is, however, somewhat surprising that some households get
more involved into farming, whereas agricultural prices are affected most negatively by
the policy changes. This outcome is strongly driven by the adjustments in the prices for
household labour and land which take place in the context of the households’ adjustment
to the price shock. In parts, these results are unexpected but cannot be discarded as unre-
alistic.
In general, simulation results are in line with those obtained from the aggregate CGE
analysis by Zhai and Hertel (2010). Poverty as well as inequality increases, although
poverty effects are weaker in the village equilibrium model. At a more detailed level,
returns to agricultural labour as well as land decline. In accordance with Zhai and Hertel
(2010), the village model predicts an increase in migration from the village. The rise
11in migration by around 0.3% from the village model compares to 0.1% for unskilled
labour and 1.3% for semi-skilled labour in the CGE model. The village model, however,
shows that this migration response may not be uniform among households, but some
might return home while others migrate more. This difference, in turn, could be attributed
to differences in household demographics.
With respect to most of the more aggregate variables such as net household income,
welfare, village trade or inequality and poverty, the attempt to incorporate different as-
sumptions on households’ migration behaviour has brought about only small differences.
Regarding the labour allocation of the households, in particular with respect to migration
and agricultural production, as well as the associated village level variables, differences,
however, have become more signiﬁcant. This suggests that differences in labour migra-
tion which stem from differences in household demographics may well play a role for
the outcome of a particular reform. This is all the more true for other possible reform
scenarios which would entail larger changes in relative prices. Also, if the primary focus
of the modelling effort would be different, say, for example, on the impacts of a reform
on agricultural output, the current set-up of the model can help to shed light on important
aspects of the interplay between migration, land markets and agricultural production.
Moreover, the speciﬁcation of the model in general allows a highly ﬂexible calibration
of the households’ labour market behaviour as it offers the possibility to freely choose the
magnitude of own-price and own-wage labour supply responses to the different activities.
This is particularly valuable in cases where the modelling exercise can be complemented
by detailed studies of the labour supply behaviour of the households to be modelled.
But even without such complementary information, the model represents a valuable tool
to contemplate the responses of rural household to different policy reforms and the re-
sulting community level impacts along the lines of household demographics and relative
income levels. Thereby, it constitutes an excellent source of hypotheses on the migra-
tion behaviour of rural households under changing economic environments. And ﬁnally,
the approach to include household group speciﬁc non-monetary disutilities resulting from
certain occupations in labour allocation functions in a CGE opens an interesting ﬁeld for
applications, which may also extend to levels of higher regional aggregation.
The model, however, in its current state still is an experimental one. The households’
labour demand functions have been calibrated based on a simplifying assumption of equal
own-wage/price but different cross-wage/price responses. It might be of great interest,
for example, to calibrate the model according to results of econometric analyses of labour
supply in order to achieve results with a better empirical foundation. Furthermore, in
particular the assumption of a perfect neoclassical intra-village land rental market is a
strong deviation from the Chinese reality with its particular institutional set-up and the
village model should be improved in this part.
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